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Is the use of bank debt as a governance mechanism conditioned by the financial 
system? The cases of Chile and Spain
1. Introduction
Imperfections in the capital markets mean that debt choices affect the value 
of firms (Modigliani and Miller, 1958). The existence of growth opportunities 
require that firms secure funds to finance new projects, and the choice of the ideal 
source of financing is conditioned by information asymmetry (Myers and Majluf, 
1984), agency problems (Fama, 1980), and institutional environment. Choosing the 
appropriate creditor or ownership structure are key elements in resolving these 
problems. Moreover, solving these conflicts also depends on the characteristics of 
the financial system and the level of development of the economy in which the firms 
operate (Beck and Levine, 2002; Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 2001; Gallego and 
Loayza, 2000; La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1998, 2000; 
Levine, 2002).
The objective of this study is to determine whether the use of bank debt as a 
governance mechanism in bank-based countries is conditioned by the existence of 
growth opportunities, the ownership structure of the firms, or their institutional 
environment. With this objective in mind, we use a sample of firms from two 
countries that share a common legal tradition but whose financial systems have 
evolved in different ways. We test whether bank debt choices differ depending on
the country in which the firm operates (Booth, Aivazian, Demirgüç-Kunt, and 
Maksimovic, 2001). These differences not only occur among countries with different 
legal traditions (Bancel and Mittoo, 2004, Levine, 2000; Levine and Zervos, 1998; 
Tadesse, 2002) but also among countries with the same legal tradition. For this 
reason, we compare the bank debt decisions of Spanish and Chilean firms. The 
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financial systems of these countries have the same legal tradition (i.e., civil law) and
show a concentrated ownership and a highly concentrated banking system based on 
universal banks. Furthermore, both economies exhibit a similar economic stability in 
terms of gross domestic product (GDP)  growth, inflation, interest, and exchange 
rates. However, differences exist in the size and activity of their financial markets, 
the role played by banks as a control mechanism, and banking regulations, which
could condition a firm’s choice of finance for its growth opportunities.
The sample includes 148 firms that are listed in Chile’s stock market and 111 
Spanish firms listed in the Spanish market, and the period of analysis is from 1991 to 
1999. The results of this work support our hypotheses ; namely, bank financing of 
growth opportunities depends not only on the country’s legal tradition but also on the 
institutional environment in which the firms operate. Firms use bank debt to finance 
their growth opportunities when the banks work to solve agency and asymmetric 
problems and to avoid information monopoly costs. Countries with a bank-based
financial system have an institutional environment that favors bank debt and 
ownership concentration complementarities to avoid the underinvestment problem. 
However, this complementarity has a limit. Bank d bt loses its role as a governance
mechanism to solve underinvestment and asset substitution problems if no 
alternative funding sources exist to finance a firm’s growth opportunities.
The work is divided into five sections. Following the introduction, Section 2 
offers a summary of the main theoretical contributions and our hypotheses. Section 3 
describes the sample as well as the variables and methodology, and Section 4 
presents the main results and the robustness analysis. Finally, Section 5 summarizes 
and discusses the main conclusions.
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2. Theory and empirical hypotheses
Two main problems exist for financing investment projects with debt: 
underinvestment (Myers, 1977, 2001) and asset substitution (Galai and Masulis, 
1976; Jensen, 1986; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). These problems can be resolved by 
the choice of the creditor. Bank creditors are better placed than arm’s-length 
creditors to deal with managerial discretion for several reasons. First, bank 
intermediaries have greater control of a firm than arm’s-length creditors because of 
the concentration of bank debt ownership (Blackwell and Kidwell, 1988; Fama, 
1985; James, 1987). Second, banks have more capacity than individual investors to 
obtain information about the firm’s future investment projects and to supervise the 
managers’ decisions (Denis and Mihov, 2003; Giannetti, 2003; Hadlock and James, 
2002; James and Smith, 2000). Third, banks have expertise in the supervision of 
managers. Finally, banks are more flexible in debt contract renegotiation.
Moreover, bank debt fosters a relationship of mutual confidence between the 
bank and the firm (James, 1987). This relationship makes it less necessary for the 
firm to provide information publicly regarding its activities, thereby avoiding a loss 
of competitiveness (Anderson and Makhija, 1999; Berger and Udell, 1995; 
Filatotchev and Mickiewicz, 2002; Hadlock and James, 2002; Krishnaswami, Spindt,
and Subramaniam, 1999). In the absence of sufficient arm’s-length information, 
creditors would be seriously affected by problems of adverse selection and moral 
hazard, as well as by agency costs. Therefore, firms prefer bank debt when the 
activities of the firm are hidden to external investors, either for technological reasons 
or due to the existence of specific relationships with clients, suppliers, or workers 
(Filatotchev and Mickiewicz, 2002). 
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Firms with growth opportunities potentially exhibit greater problems of 
asymmetric information (Myers and Majluf, 1984), greater agency problems 
between shareholders and lenders (Andrés, Azofra, and Rodríguez, 2000), and higher 
bankruptcy costs (Harris and Raviv, 1988, 1990; Shleifer and Vishny, 1992; 
Williamson, 1988). As a result, firms with growth opportunities should use equity 
for their financing (Hovakimian, Opler, andTitman, 2001), given that the greater the 
problems of underinvestment and asset substitution, the lower the debt level. 
However, this relation could change depending on the function of the type of creditor 
and the institutional environment in which the firm operates (Andrés, Azofra, 
Rodríguez, and Vallelado, 1997). 
Thus, when operating in an environment of efficient capital markets, the firm 
will (a) prefer to finance its growth opportunities with equity rather than resort to 
debt and (b) opt for bank debt rather than market debt. The leverage ratio then 
decreases, and the mix of market debt and bank debt changes. Thus, even if debt 
volume declines, the proportion of bank debt could rise (Barclay, Marx, and Smith, 
2003). 
However, when the firm operates in an environment dominated by bank 
intermediaries, the financing of its growth opportunities are conditioned both by the 
capacity of the financial markets to evaluate the new financial assets that the firm 
needs to issue and the capacity of the bank intermediaries to substitute for the market 
as a governance mechanism (Aivazian, Ge, and Qiu, 2005; Anderson and Makhija, 
1999; Houston and James, 1996). Therefore, in a bank-based environment, no clear 
relation exists between bank debt and growth opportunities; rather, opportunities 
depend on the relevance of bank debt to act as a governance mechanism.
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Thus, our first hypothesis is that financing firms’ growth opportunities in 
bank-based countries via bank debt depend on the existence of an institutional 
environment that identifies bank debt as an efficient—and sometimes only—
governance mechanism to control information asymmetry and agency problems: the 
more relevant the role of banks as a mechanism to control firm managers in the 
country, the higher the dependence on bank debt to finance growth opportunities. As 
Myers (2000) points out, the monitoring capacity of fund suppliers becomes the key 
element when the firm has growth opportunities. 
Information asymmetry and agency problems are also important when the 
firm does not generate sufficient funds internally. These firms are then obliged to 
resort to external funds to complete their financing. Moreover, their incapacity to 
generate sufficient funds internally puts them in a weak negotiating position with 
their creditors, especially with the banks, who are the best-informed creditors. In 
these cases of insufficient internal funding, the firms’ need for funds increases over 
time, and they thus have a greater probability of suffering bankruptcy or other severe 
underinvestment problems. Furthermore, in bank-based countries, lenders (mainly 
banks) could be aware of a firm’s difficulties in generating internal funds. Banks 
then use their market power to reduce their credit risk in that firm and force an 
increase in equity (Bottazzi, Da Rin, and Hellmann, 2005). Thus, our second 
hypothesis postulates that firms’ borrowing capacity with bank intermediaries in 
bank-based countries decreases as their capacity to generate funds internally
diminishes. 
A special case concerns firms with a deficit in their generation of internal 
funds but which at the same time have profitable investment opportunities. The 
monitoring capacity of bank creditors could allow firms with net positive value 
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projects to obtain the funds they need under the best possible conditions (Denis and 
Mihov, 2003; Stulz, 1990). As a consequence, firms with external financing needs 
and growth opportunities should be financed with bank debt to signal the quality of 
their growth opportunities. Bank debt becomes the least undervalued external fund. 
However, bank debt loses its role as a signal of growth opportunities quality in those 
countries in which banks are the main source of funds—either via equity or debt. 
Thus, resorting to bank financing is directly related to the level of development of 
the financial system (Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999, 2002). 
In the absence of a legal system that protects the rights of external investors 
in firms, financial transactions are carried out via bank intermediaries with sufficient 
bargaining power to ensure compliance with the contractual clauses without having 
to resort to the courts (Modigliani and Perotti, 2000). Thus, using bank debt to 
finance growth opportunities is especially important in those countries in which the 
banks have a central role and are an efficient governance mechanism in the solution 
of the information asymmetry and agency problems. In this scenario, a firm’s
capacity to generate internal funds makes no difference to the financing of new 
projects. Therefore, our third hypothesis is that firms generating insufficient funds 
internally to finance their growth opportunities will use bank debt depending on 
whether the institutional environment identifies the use of bank debt as a signal of 
growth opportunities quality: If banks are the firms only source of funds, the bank 
debt losses its role as a signal.
A firm’s agency problems vary depending on its ownership structure 
(Brailsford, Oliver, and Pua, 2002; Jensen, 1986; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; La 
Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, and Shleifer, 1999). When ownership is concentrated, 
managers have the incentive to choose the type of debt that maximizes firm value
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(i.e., bank debt; Bharadwaj and Shivdasani, 2003; Denis and Mihov, 2003) because 
it mitigates underinvestment and asset substitution problems. In this sense, 
Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) and John and Kedia (2000), among others, argue that 
firms with concentrated ownership should resort to bank creditors, given that bank 
debt and concentrated ownership are complementary elements in the design of an 
optimal system of corporate governance. Banks become the counterbalance that 
avoids an opportunistic behavior on the part of the firm’s majority shareholders 
(Jensen, 1986). Then, in those countries in which firms’ ownership is concentrated,
bank debt becomes the main source of financing.
However, firms’ ownership concentration differs among countries. The 
relation between the ownership structure and debt depends on the relative 
importance of each financing source in each country (Allen and Gale, 2001; Barth, 
Caprio, and Levine, 2000, 2001; Beck and Levine; 2002; Johnson and Shleifer, 
2000; La Porta et al., 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000; Levine, 2002; Tadesse, 2002). In 
environments with legal gaps in investor protection and low levels of compliance 
with the law, the development of financial markets is hindered, and financing via 
bank credit is favored (Modigliani and Perotti, 1997; La Porta et al., 1997; Shleifer 
and Vhisny, 1997; Thakor, 1996). Bank deposits are a form of secured investment 
for savers through the guarantee of deposit insurance (Modigliani and Perotti, 2000). 
Thus, we expect the relation between bank debt and ownership structure to be
conditioned by the presence of growth opportunities and the financial development 
of the country in which the firm operates. Therefore, our fourth hypothesis postulates 
that the majority ownership structure of firms lacking growth opportunities in bank-
based countries facilitates bank debt by aligning the interests of managers, 
shareholders, and creditors. However, when the firm has growth opportunities, the 
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relation between ownership concentration and bank financing depend on (a) the 
capacity of the financial markets of each country not to undervalue the new share 
issues, (b) the majority shareholders’ strategies aimed at avoiding dilution of their 
shareholding and their subsequent loss of control, and (c) the role that the banks play 
as a governance mechanism in the country in which the firm operates. 
Majority shareholders prefer bank debt to finance those growth opportunities 
they consider essential for the survival of the firm in which they have invested a 
substantial part of their wealth (Giannetti, 2003). A firm will finance its growth 
opportunities with bank debt if doing so adds value in comparison to other sources of 
funds. However, when banks are the only governance mechanism, firm managers do 
not have any incentive to issue bank debt to finance the new projects. In the same 
vein, a firm will reject such financing if the institutional environment favors 
creditors’ excessive control over the firms’ decisions.
Firms with a concentrated ownership structure and external financing needs 
emphasize the problems of asymmetric information and minimize the agency 
problems between shareholders and managers. The majority shareholders refuse to
form a diversified portfolio and assume a greater nondiversifiable risk, a position 
that aligns with the managers’ interests. The most appropriate financing source for 
this type of firm is bank debt, which allows firms to reduce the problems of adverse 
selection and moral hazard through effective monitoring by the banks. These 
financial intermediaries specialize in supervising firms because they concentrate the 
debt ownership of the firm. Our fifth hypothesis, therefore, is that the relation 
between bank debt and ownership concentration in firms with a need for external 
funds will be positive as long as lenders, majority shareholders, and managers are 
interested in investments that diversify the risk (Bharadwaj and Shivdasani, 2003). 
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However, this relation will be negative if the major shareholder fears that the lender 
will eventually hold excessive control over the firm’s decisions. The existence of a 
lender information monopoly could be used to exploit the profits raised by the 
projects undertaken (Rajan, 1992). The majority shareholder will prefer to reduce the 
bank’s information monopoly as much as possible. Nevertheless, this preference is 
conditioned by the country’s banking system and by the availability of other sources 
of funds. 
These arguments support our hypothesis that the characteristics of the institutional 
environment determines the choice of lender when firms need external funds. 
Therefore, including institutional variables in the models significantly enhances our 
understanding about the capital structure choices of firms (Utrero, 2004).
3. Sample, variables, and methodology
3.1 Sample
We use a sample of firms listed on the financial markets of Chile and Spain 
to test our hypotheses about the relations among bank debt, growth opportunities, 
ownership structure, and the institutional environment. For our purposes, the firms of 
Chile and Spain are good samples because they operate in countries that share the 
same legal tradition, have economic stability, are dominated by bank intermediaries,
and exhibit a concentrated ownership among firms. In addition, a firm’s financial 
decisions must account for the financial systems that show differences in terms of 
bank and financial regulation, bank concentration, and the role of banks as a 
governance mechanism for companies. Thus, this sample selection allows us to 
determine whether debt decisions are conditioned by the institutional development of 
each country.
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We obtain the information for the analysis of Chilean firms from the Ficha 
Estadística Codificada Uniforme [Uniform Codified Stadistic File] published by the 
Superintendencia de Valores and Seguro [Securities and Exchange Commission] in 
Chile. This data include information from the balance sheet, the income statement, 
the firms’ ownership structure, and the market value of the shares traded on the stock 
exchange in Santiago. Our sample includes data from 148 nonfinancial firms from 
1991 to 1999, accounting for a total of 1,154 year-observations. We classify the 148 
firms into eight different industries: food, fisheries, and agriculture (n = 26); cement 
and building (n = 10); real estate properties (n = 7); transport and 
telecommunications (n = 12); textile, paper, and cellulose (n = 15); utilities and 
energy (n = 27); services (n = 36); and mining (n = 15). 
Nonfinancial Spanish firms total 111, with data collected from 1991 to 1999,
for a total of 823 year observations. We obtain the information about the balance 
sheet, the income statement, and ownership structure from the Comisión Nacional 
del Mercado de Valores [Stock Market National Commission]. Similarly to the 
Chilean case, we classify the Spanish firms into eight industries: food, fisheries, and 
agriculture (n = 13); cement and building (n = 22); real estate properties (n = 10); 
transport and telecommunications (n = 8); textile, paper, and cellulose (n = 11); 
utilities and energy (n = 19); services (n = 8); and mining (n = 20). We consider both 
samples to be representative of Chilean and Spanish firms. 
3.2. Variables
Certain indicators allow us to compare the financial systems of Chile and 
Spain. Following Wurgler (2000) and Andrés et al. (1997), we use the following 
ratios: size of bank sector (bank deposits / GDP), banks’ credit activity (bank credits 
Page 11 of 42
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
12
conceded to nonpublic firms / GDP), stock market activity (stock market 
capitalization / GDP), financial market liquidity (stock market assets traded / GDP),
bank concentration, ownership structure, intangibles, volume of short-term and long-
term debt, and the relative importance of bank debt. These ratios are calculated at 
different periods to capture the different evolutionary processes of the two financial 
systems (see Table 1). 
Spain and Chile exhibit similarities in the concentration of their firms’ 
ownership structures (45% and 51%, respectively) and in the presence of a few 
banks that concentrate most of the banking assets in their financial systems (61% and 
50%, respectively) as should be expected in countries that share the civil law legal 
tradition (see Table 1).
However, we observe that such similarities hide relevant differences between 
these two countries concerning the use of bank debt as a governance mechanism. 
Thus, Table 1 shows that in the past 15 years bank deposits have grown significantly 
in Spain, while Chile has seen a more mod st growth in deposits (15%). Spain also 
stands out for its growth in bank credits to nonpublic firms. Thus, debt ownership is 
more concentrated in the hands of banks in Spain. 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
We also see a different evolution in the relative importance of the financial 
markets in Spain and Chile. Although Spain’s market capitalization and volume of 
assets traded in its stock markets increased at a faster pace, Chile experienced an 
important growth in its stock market capitalization and a more moderate growth in 
its traded assets. However, the openness of the Chilean financial system during the 
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1990s drove their companies to finance themselves outside of Chile. The reform 
processes of these two countries’ financial systems have been adapted to their 
geopolitical environments, resulting in diverging outcomes. Consequently, the role 
of bank intermediaries and financial markets as governance mechanisms have 
evolved differently: Whereas in Spain the higher relevance of financial markets has
not reduced the preeminent role of bank debt as governance mechanism, in Chile 
financial reforms have increased the relevance of the equity and debt markets and 
reduced the role of bank debt as a governance mechanism (Lefort and Walker, 
2000). Thus, Chile shows a more balanced situation among external governance
mechanisms such as equity, market debt, and bank debt.
We include all listed nonfinancial firms for which we have data. Some of 
them disappear during the period of analysis, so our panel is unbalanced. The study 
of firms’ ownership structures requires that the firms’ financial assets trade in a 
regulated and transparent market. We discard those observations for which we have 
incomplete data. We likewise exclude financial firms because the nature of their 
business would distort the results. Firms included in the sample can issue bank debt, 
public debt, or new shares in the markets in which they operate. 
The debt agency problems (i.e., asset substitution and underinvestment) only 
occur in situations in which debt exists. Therefore, we ignore observations from 
firms financing themselves exclusively with equity because our objective is to study 
the potential problems of debt (5.9% and 8.1% for Chile and Spain, respectively); 
this exclusion has no significant effect on our results. 
We calculate ratios from financial statements to approximate each one of the 
variables that we consider relevant for this work. We use the ratio of bank debt to 
total assets (BDAB) as our dependent variable, and we use the percentage of shares 
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in the hands of the major shareholder (OWN) to measure ownership concentration. 
Five dummy variables account for the nature of the main shareholder: family 
(FAMFM), institutional investor (i.e., banks in the Spanish sample and mutual funds 
in the Chilean sample; INSINV), domestic firm (DOMFM), multinational firm,
(MULFM); and the administration (PUBFM). We measure firms’ growth 
opportunities with the market-to-book ratio (Q) (e.g., Barclay, Morellec, and Smith, 
2001; Barclay et al., 2003; Cuñat, 1999; Johnson, 1997a, 1997b, 2003; 
Krishnaswami et al., 1999). We calculate a company’s need for external funds (DEF) 
through the variation of fixed assets plus the variation of working capital minus cash 
flow scaled by total assets (Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999; Sogorb and López, 
2003). 
We use three interaction variables. The first relates the firm’s ownership 
structure to the existence of growth opportunities (OWN*QI). It takes the value of 
OWN for firms with growth opportunities (Q > 1), and zero otherwise. The second 
relates the firm’s finance deficit or surplus with the existence of majority control 
(DEF*OWNI). It takes the value of DEF for firms in which the main shareholder 
owns at least a 50% stake, and zero otherwise. The third interaction variable relates 
firms’ growth opportunities with the need for external funds (Q*DEFI). It takes the 
value of Q for firms with external fund needs (DEF > 0), and zero otherwise. 
We use size, return on assets (ROA), leverage, and Altman’s Z score as 
control variables. We calculate firms’ size from the book value of their assets. The 
logarithmic transformation of this variable is the accepted solution to work with 
variables that have nonnegative and high-variance values (LNTAB). We use ROA to 
measure the profitability of the firms’ portfolios of projects. Altman’s Z score is our 
proxy for a firm’s bankruptcy probability and is determined according to the 
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following equation (Altman, 2002): Z = 1.2 (working capital / total assets) + 1.4 
(retained profits / total assets) + 3.3 (profits before interests and taxes / total assets) + 
0.6 (equity capital at market value / total liabilities) + 1.0 (sales / total assets). 
Finally, the debt-to-equity ratio (TDEB) is our proxy for a firm’s insolvency risk. 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistical data.
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
3.3 Methodology
We analyze our data in two stages. First, we perform a descriptive analysis to 
identify the characteristics of Chilean and Spanish firms. We apply the analysis of 
variance to find statistically significant differences. Second, we perform a regression 
analysis applying panel data econometrics as the characteristics of our sample permit 
the use of this methodology. Panel data methodology allows us to control for the 
unobservable heterogeneity of the data and to consider the endogeneity problems 
(i.e., simultaneity bias) that are so common in studies on managerial decisions 
(Arellano and Bover, 1990). The presence of unobs rvable fixed effects associated to 
each firm and correlated with the rest of the independent variables can produce bias 
and inconsistent estimations. This problem is solved by transforming the variables 
into first differences (first-difference estimators). On the other hand, following 
Antoniou, Guney, and Paudyal (2002) who argue that the first difference 
specifications of the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) are superior to 
alternative methodologies, we use GMM  to solve the endogeneity problem of the 
independent variables related to the error term. Therefore, once the fixed effects are 
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controlled and the endogeneity adequately considered, estimations become robust 
and consistent. 
However, using the first-difference estimator is not without its problems. 
Alonso-Borrego and Arellano (1999) show statistically that the instruments in the 
panel difference estimator are often weak. This weakness would lead to biases in 
finite samples and to a poor asymptotic precision. On the other hand, the 
differentiation can worsen the bias caused by the measurement errors in the variables 
via the reduction in the signal-to-noise ratio (Beck and Levine, 2004). At the same 
time, the first differences cause loss of information among the cross-sectional units 
(in our case, the sample firms). Thus, to reduce the potential biases and the errors of 
imprecision associated with the difference estimator, we use the estimators 
calculated with the system estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1998). Blundell and Bond 
(1998) show that the system estimator is much more efficient in cases in which the 
difference estimator performs poorly, especially for finite samples such as ours. This 
system consists of two equations, each one with its own instruments. The first type 
of equations is in levels and its instruments are the lagged differences in the 
dependent variable and the independent variables. The second type of equations are 
equations in first differences with the levels of the dependent variable and the 
independent variables as instruments (Gaud, Jani, Hoesli, and Bender, 2005; 
Goergen and Renneboog, 2001). Our regression model is 
.
,
1
,,0, ti
n
j
tjijti XY  
=
++= ,
where i equals 1 to 148 for the sample of Chilean firms and 1 to 111 for the Spanish 
firms, t  ranges from 1991 to 1999, and ti,  corresponds to the error term, which 
includes the individual effect, the time effect, and the stochastic error. The dependent 
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variable is the bank debt to total assets ratio (BDAB). The explanatory or 
independent variables are ownership structure (OWN), growth opportunities (Q), 
external financing needs (DEF), ROA, firm size (LNTAB), debt-to-equity ratio 
(TDEB), and Altman’s Z score. The interaction variables are ownership structure and 
growth opportunities (OWN*QI), the financing deficit or surplus and majority 
control (DEF*OWNI), and growth opportunities and external financing needs 
(Q*DEFI). We include time dummy variables (DUMMTEMP) for each of the years 
from 1991 to 1999, dummy variables for each of the eight industries to which the 
sample firms belong (DUMMSEC), and dummy variables for the nature of the main 
shareholder. 
4. Results
In this section we describe the main characteristics of Chilean and Spanish 
firms, specifically dealing with the institutional framework in which they operate. 
We then present the results of our regression analysis. 
4.1 Descriptive analysis 
Bank debt, which is one of the main characteristics of financial systems 
dominated by banks (Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 1999, 2001; Thakor, 1996), is the 
primary source of external funds in both Chilean and Spanish firms. Another element 
found in both the Chilean and Spanish financial systems that is characteristic of 
civil-law countries is the ownership concentration of nonfinancial firms. In both 
Chilean and in Spanish firms, on average, the first shareholder of the firm owns more 
than 40% of the shares (44.19% and 40.93% for Chilean and Spanish firms, 
respectively). This high ownership concentration supports the argument that firms’ 
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ownership structures could be the result of investors’ reaction to a weak protection of 
their rights. 
However, Spanish firms are more leveraged and use more bank debt than 
Chilean firms. Thus, the TDEB is 91% for Spanish firms, compared with 45% for 
Chilean firms. Bank debt in Spanish firms is about 17% of the assets and 54% of the 
total debt whereas Chilean firms show values of 12% and 41%, respectively (see 
Table 2). This result is consistent with the higher relevance of banks as a source of 
funds and as a governance mechanism for firms in Spain than in Chile. 
We observe that, on average, the proxy for the Tobin’s Q ratio is higher than 
1 in both countries, although it is slightly higher in Chile than in Spain (1.34 and 
1.23, respectively). This result means that growth opportunities are generally 
available both in Chilean and Spanish nonfinancial firms. However, we observe 
differences in terms of return and risk between Chilean and Spanish firms. Namely, 
Chilean firms have higher ROA and higher Altman Z scores than Spanish firms. 
Thus, Chilean firms are, on average, simultaneously more profitable, more solvent,
and less leveraged than Spanish firms. We consider that such differences are related 
to the different role bank debt plays in Spain and Chile as a governance mechanism. 
These figures are also supported by the variable financing deficit (DEF). We observe 
that Chilean and Spanish firms generate, on average, internal cash flows in excess of 
the funds they need to finance their investments. However, the surplus is higher for 
Chilean firms (11% of total assets vs. 8% of total assets for Chilean and Spanish 
firms, respectively). 
Additionally, we classify our sample firms according to the nature of the 
main investor. The figures reveal that in most Chilean firms the main shareholder is 
either a domestic firm (46%) or a mutual fund (40%). These data are evidence that 
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legal changes introduced in the 1990s have reinforced the relevance of institutional 
investors (mutual and pension funds) as owners of Chilean firms (Gallego and 
Loayza, 2000; Lefort and Walker, 1999; Majluf, Abarca, Rodríguez, and Fuentes, 
1998). In contrast, we find no clear pattern in the nature of the main shareholder
within Spanish firms. In 26% of Spanish firms, the main owner is a domestic firm; in 
26%, a family; in 19%, a multinational firm; in 18%, a bank; and in the remaining 
12% the main shareholder is the administration. We emphasize the different role 
played by banks in Chile and Spain:  Whereas Spanish banks are the main 
shareholder in one of every five firms and they can be minority owners in the rest of
the companies, Chilean banks are forbidden to own shares of nonfinancial 
companies.
To expand the descriptive analysis, we build two country samples—Chilean 
firms and Spanish firms—to perform the mean difference analysis. Each country 
sample is divided into three subsamples by the ratio bank debt to total assets 
(BDAB) and bank debt to total debt (BDTD). They contain the firms with low levels 
of bank debt, average levels of bank debt, and high levels of bank debt. To reinforce 
the results of our analyses, we compare the mean values of the subsamples with low 
and high levels of bank debt for each country. The results of this analysis are shown 
in Table 3. 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
We observe statistically significant differences among the behaviors observed 
in Chilean and Spanish firms. Specifically, Chilean firms that use more bank debt 
present greater risk, greater external financing needs, and lower ROA than Chilean 
firms less indebted with banks. For their part, the Spanish firms with more bank debt
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present lower ownership concentration, lower growth opportunities, lower ROA, and 
greater risk than those with less bank debt. Moreover, the analysis of variance shows 
that Spanish firms whose main shareholder is a family present higher proportions of 
bank debt, whereas the opposite occurs whenever the main shareholder is a 
multinational firm. Therefore, both Chilean and Spanish firms with high bank debt 
volumes use more external funds, have higher risk, and less ROA than firms that use 
less bank financing. However, we observe differences in ownership structure and 
growth opportunities among the Spanish firms in function of their use of bank debt 
that are not observed in Chilean firms (see Table 3). We argue that such differences 
are a consequence of the different role played by bank debt as a governance
mechanism.
4.2 Results of the regression analysis
In this part of the analysis, we interpret our panel data regression results. We 
distinguish between Chilean and Spanish firms to observe differences in their bank 
debt decisions depending on the institutional and geopolitical environment in which 
the firms operate. The results are summarized in Table 4. In all cases, we use Wald 
tests to determine the significance both of the model and of the different dummy
variables used in each model. The different Wald tests are statistically significant. 
The Sargan test allows us to accept the null hypothesis that the model is correctly 
identified, including the instruments used to solve the endogeneity problems of the 
variables (i.e., simultaneity bias). 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE
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Our first hypothesis, which relates to bank debt and growth opportunities, is 
supported by our results. Most studies of firms in the United States (a common law 
country) report a negative relation between growth opportunities and bank debt 
(Denis and Mihov, 2003; Hadlock and James, 2002; Houston and James, 1996; 
Johnson, 1997a). As predicted by our hypothesis, we observe that the relation 
between growth opportunities and bank financing depends on the institutional 
environment in which the firm operates. Thus, Chilean firms operate in an 
environment in which banks share with markets the role as a governance 
mechanisms. In addition, we observe less need for external funds to finance their 
growth opportunities. Our results do not show a significant relation between bank 
debt and growth opportunities. On the other hand, in Spain, where banks are the 
main supervisors and the main source of funds, firms show a positive relation 
between growth opportunities and bank debt. This positive relation agrees with Ojah 
and Manrique (2005) result but modifies the negative relation for Spanish companies 
found by Andrés, López, Rodríguez, and Vallelado (2005) using first-differences 
estimator. Such negative relation is not robust to changes in the way of measuring
bank debt whereas our positive relation is based in the system estimator, which is 
more suitable for finite samples, and it is robust to changes in the dependent variable .
The deregulation of capital movements in Chile in the 1990s (which coincides with 
our period of analysis) could be at the origin of the results obtained, given that the 
institutional changes encouraged the Chilean firms in our sample to imitate the 
behaviors of U.S. firms in terms of bank debt decisions. Another institutional 
difference is that whereas Spanish banks can be simultaneously creditors and 
shareholders in a firm, in Chile this dual role is prohibited by law. Thus, banks can 
control asymmetric information and agency problems more efficiently in Spain than 
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in Chile, which encourages firms to resort to bank debt when they have growth 
opportunities (Bartholdy et al., 1997).
Our second hypothesis is also verified. We observe a negative relation 
between the need for external financing and bank debt in the absence of majority 
ownership. In this case, the high bank concentration in both countries indicates that 
firms less able to generate funds internally have limited borrowing capacity because 
of their greater agency problems and credit risk. Banks will use their market power 
to reduce their exposure to firms with cash flow problems. 
A firm’s capacity to generate funds internally to finance growth opportunities 
could also condition its bank debt decisions as problems of asymmetric information 
are more important when the need for external financing grows. We observe a 
positive relation between growth opportunities and bank debt for Chilean firms with 
external financial needs. Chilean firms that have to finance their growth 
opportunities with external funds would likely prefer to rely on bank financing 
because of the greater flexibility in control, without assuming the risk of ownership 
dilution that stock issuance entails. Furthermore, Chilean firms with a financial 
deficit use more bank debt to signal the quality of their growth opportunities. 
Spanish firms, on the other hand, prefer bank debt to finance their growth 
opportunities even if they generate enough internal funds, because it is an efficient 
way of avoiding the dissemination of firm information that could jeopardize their 
competitiveness. Yosha (1995) points out that a positive relation could exist between 
growth opportunities and bank debt levels for U.S. firms that are trying to avoid the 
diffusion of information considered strategic for the firm. Furthermore, the higher 
debt levels of Spanish firms foster bank debt to avoid an inefficient liquidation. 
Spanish firms do not need to use bank debt to signal the quality of their growth 
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opportunities because banks are the main governance mechanism and the main 
source of funds.
The results also support our third hypothesis that firms generating insufficient 
funds internally to finance their growth opportunities will use bank debt depending 
on whether the institutional environment identifies the use of bank debt as a signal of 
growth opportunities quality. The banking environments in Spain and Chile and the 
high ownership concentration favor the use of bank debt to finance firms with needs 
for external funds and growth opportunities. In Chilean firms,  the use of bank debt is 
particularly important when the firm has growth opportunities but cannot generate 
sufficient funds internally, whereas in Spain the extent to which the firm can 
generate funds internally does not affect its decision to finance its growth 
opportunities with bank debt.
This difference could be because Chilean banks do not participate in the 
ownership of firms so that firms are reluctant to issue bank debt to finance their 
growth opportunities when internal funds are available because of underinvestment 
and asset substitution problems. Bank concentration and ownership concentration are 
alternative governance mechanisms in Chile. In the Spanish case, banks’ ability to 
participate in firm ownership means that when firms have new growth opportunities 
they opt for bank debt without hesitation as the best source to finance their projects. 
Bank concentration and ownership concentration are complementary governance
mechanisms in Spain.
The results support our fourth hypothesis as we observe a positive and 
statistically significant relation between ownership concentration and bank debt in 
Spain and Chile. Ownership concentration and bank concentration are two of the 
characteristics shared by the financial systems of these two countries. Banks prefer 
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to lend funds to firms with a low level of agency conflicts among shareholders and 
managers. In this case, the monitoring costs required to guarantee the optimal 
allocation of the funds are reduced (James and Smith, 2000). The high ownership 
concentration of firms acts as a substitution mechanism for the market for corporate 
control (takeovers) present in those financial systems whose architecture is based on 
financial markets (Jandik and Makhija, 2005). Consequently, shareholding 
concentration and bank concentration help to align the interests of shareholders, 
managers, and creditors, thereby providing these firms with access to bank debt. 
These results support the hypothesis that bank debt is more predominant in firms 
with less agency problems between shareholders and managers. This finding 
confirms the arguments of Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) and John and Kedia 
(2000), who find that concentrated ownership and bank debt are complementary 
elements in an optimal system of corporate governance. 
However, in the Chilean case we observe that as ownership concentration 
increases in firms with growth opportunities, bank debt also increases. In Spanish 
firms, the opposite occurs. In Chile, managers use bank debt to signal the quality of 
their growth opportunities, and bank debt thereby allows firms to maintain control 
and avoid the undervaluation of their shares. Moreover, in Chile, issuing bank debt 
when growth opportunities exist and in the presence of concentrated ownership is a 
signal to the market that a firm offers good investment opportunities. This signal 
becomes more necessary given that the banks do not participate in firm ownership. 
On the other hand, underinvestment problems are more severe in Spanish 
firms, which are more leveraged. Ownership concentration reduces the agency 
problems between shareholders and managers, but it increases the agency problems 
between lenders and shareholders (underinvestment) when growth opportunities 
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exist and the firm is highly leveraged. Spanish banks prefer to finance the new 
growth opportunities through equity instead of bank debt. Banks are the main 
governance mechanism, and firms have no alternative source of funds. Therefore, if 
a nonfinancial firm has good growth opportunities, the bank will prefer to buy 
undervalued shares before lending them. On the other hand, if the firm’s growth 
opportunities are not worthwhile, banks will refuse to finance the company.
We also observe differences among Spanish and Chilean firms regarding the 
use of bank debt for companies with majority ownership and external financing 
needs. Spanish firms with a major shareholder who owns at least 50% of shares and 
a deficit of funds to finance investment projects show a positive relation with bank 
debt (see Table 4). The results support our hypothesis that in this type of firms an 
alignment of interests among shareholders, managers and lenders results in the 
investment in risk-diversifying projects. The use of bank debt avoids the problems of 
ownership dilution and reduces the agency problems between shareholders and 
managers. Furthermore, banks’ market power in Spain reduces the possibility that 
borrowers will behave opportunistically, expropriating banks (Faccio, Lang, and 
Young, 2001). 
Chilean firms with majority control and external financing needs show a 
negative relation with bank financing. The results support our final hypothesis. 
Chilean firms with majority control are concerned about creditors holding excessive 
control over their decisions. The majority shareholders are more concerned with 
avoiding the control of the banks than about a possible inefficient liquidation of the 
firm. Structural changes in the Chilean financial system have reduced the relative 
importance of bank debt in firm financing, and after the deregulation of capital 
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movements, firms with good ratings are allowed to issue debt and shares in external 
markets (American Depository Receipts). 
Finally, we control for those variables that appear in most empirical work on 
bank debt to avoid specification problems in our regression model. These control 
variables are leverage, size, probability of bankruptcy, ROA, industry, and nature of 
main shareholder. The results are in agreement with previous empirical analysis. 
Thus, the debt-to-equity ratio (TDEB) presents a positive and statistically significant 
coefficient (Johnson, 1997b). The largest firms exhibit higher levels of bank debt
(Andres et al., 2005). This result, however, is contrary to that observed in samples of 
U.S. firms, for which a substitution effect of bank debt by public debt exists in the 
largest U.S. companies (Denis and Mihov, 2003; Hadlock and James, 2002; Johnson, 
1997a). The greater market power of the banking industry in bank-based countries
makes bank financing in these economies the primary source of external funds. 
Besides, we observe a negative relation between ROA and bank debt (Denis and 
Mihov, 2003). Similarly, firms with a high r probability of bankruptcy are most 
interested in bank debt (Hege, 2003; James and Smith, 2000). 
4.3 Alternative specifications
To corroborate the robustness of our results, we repeat the regression 
analyses for both Chilean and Spanish firms with bank debt over total debt (BDTD) 
as dependent variable. The regressions for Spanish firms show a second-order 
correlation in the models using GMM. This result indicates the lack of consistency of 
the estimators. The absence of serial correlation is essential for the consistency of the 
estimators in these models, in particular, second-order correlation. However, even 
though the new estimations of the coefficients for Spanish firms are inconsistent, the 
Page 26 of 42
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
27
results obtained with bank debt over total debt are rather similar to those obtained 
when the dependent variable is bank debt to total assets. In the case of Chilean firms, 
when we modify the dependent variable, we obtain consistent estimators. Thus, we 
can appreciate the robustness of our results against changes in the dependent 
variable. 
We run a regression analysis for an incomplete panel comprising 111 Spanish 
firms and 148 Chilean firms for the period from 1991 to 1999 to corroborate the 
differences among the bank debt decisions of Chilean and Spanish firms. In this 
regression of the full sample, we include a dummy variable to differentiate the firms 
in each country. The TRADMK variable, which corresponds to stock market value 
traded to GDP, is also included to measure the activity of the stock market in each 
country and for each of the analyzed years. The results of this analysis corroborate 
our hypothesis that differences exist in bank debt decisions between Chilean and 
Spanish firms, although both countries have a legal system based on civil law, a 
bank-based financial system, and a strongly concentrated ownership structure. In 
spite of these coincidences, the evolution processes of the respective institutional 
environments have followed diverging patterns that have conditioned firms’ bank 
debt decisions in a different way, particularly in the presence of growth 
opportunities. 
Finally, we repeat the analysis with alternative measures of ownership 
concentration, financial deficit, leverage, and size. In all cases, the results remain 
qualitatively unchanged.
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5. Conclusions
The underinvestment and asset substitution problems posed by the use of debt 
can be reduced by means of the appropriate choice of type of lender, which can
reduce asymmetric information problems and agency costs. Asymmetric information 
problems are especially significant in firms with growth opportunities and a need for 
external funds, whereas agency costs depends on the firm’s ownership structure. 
Furthermore, the ownership structure and the choice of creditor are complementary 
elements in the design of an optimal system of corporate governance (Dewatripont 
and Tirole, 1994; John and Kedia, 2000). Finally, analysis of bank debt decisions is 
incomplete if we ignore the financial system in which companies operate. 
We argue that bank debt decisions taken by firms with growth opportunities 
are not only conditioned by the asymmetric information and agency problems 
associated with the debt relation in imperfect markets but also by the peculiarities of 
the legal and institutional environment in which these firms operate. These 
characteristics depend on the country and cannot be formulated within a standardized 
pattern. Reforms carried out in each country determine the evolution and outcomes 
of the legal and institutional framework in which firms operate. We test whether the 
use of bank debt as a governance mechanism in bank-based countries is conditioned 
by the existence of growth opportunities, firms’ ownership structure, their need for 
external funds, or by the institutional environment in which they operate.
For the empirical analysis, we use samples of firms from Chile and Spain. 
These two countries share a common legal tradition based on civil law and a 
concentrated bank system as the key element of their financial systems. However,
differences in their financial systems affect the role played by the bank debt as a 
governance mechanism: (a) Debt ownership is more concentrated in Spain than in 
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Chile; (b) unlike Chilean banks, Spanish banks are allowed to become shareholders 
of nonfinancial firms; and (c) banks in Spain are more relevant as a governance
mechanism and a source of funds than in Chile. These differences are the result of 
the recent attempts to reform the financial markets of Chile and Spain, which are 
located in different geographical areas, with differing economic cycles, and strategic 
priorities.
We consider the two samples to be appropriate to test our hypotheses about 
the effect of the bank-based institutional environment on firms’ bank debt decisions
as bank debt is predominant in both cases. Our sample firms resort to bank debt 
much more than U.S. firms do. However, Spanish firms are not only more leveraged 
than Chilean ones but they also resort more frequently to bank debt in relative terms. 
Spanish firms have greater need for external funds, and a large proportion of these 
firms have as their main shareholder a family, multinational firm, or the public 
administration. On the other hand, Chilean firms stand out for their greater 
ownership concentration, growth opportunities, solvency, and ROA. In terms of 
ownership structure, we observe an important proportion of firms whose main 
shareholder is a domestic firm or institutional investor.
The bank debt decisions of nonfinancial firms from Spain and Chile have 
different explanatory factors, and the diverging evolutions of the two countries’ 
financial systems are a possible explanation. These differences exist even though the 
corporate environments of the two countries share certain similarities, including high 
bank concentration, high ownership concentration, and a legal system based on civil 
law, among others.
Our findings confirm that bank financing of growth opportunities depends on 
the institutional environment in which firms operate, even if they share the same 
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legal tradition. Firms use bank debt to finance their growth opportunities when the 
banks of that country contribute to solving information asymmetry and agency 
problems and avoid information monopoly costs. Countries with financial systems 
dominated by the banks have an institutional environment that favors the 
complementarity of bank debt and ownership concentration to avoid the 
underinvestment problem when growth opportunities exist. However, this 
complementarity has a limit, namely, when the control over the ownership of the 
firm is threatened by the power of the creditor banks. In this case, bank debt is still 
used to finance growth opportunities but to a lesser extent than it would be in the 
absence of hold-up costs.
Ownership concentration in firms together with bank concentration favors 
bank debt because these conditions align the interests of shareholders, managers, and 
creditors. This alignment can help firms to invest in projects that allow them to 
diversify their risk. However, firms with majority ownership and less capacity to 
generate funds internally—and that operate in an environment in which the banks 
have excessive power over firm decisions—will maintain a negative relation with 
bank debt to avoid hold-up costs. In countries with a high bank concentration, bank 
debt represents a signal of the quality of the growth opportunities available. These 
opportunities are financed with bank debt because bank debt is the most abundant 
resource and, at the same time, the market is indirectly informed about the firm’s 
growth opportunities. Chilean and Spanish firms with external financing needs and 
poor growth opportunities will refuse to be financed with bank debt. Their 
concentrated ownership will act as a substitute for the role played by debt in 
dispersed ownership firms.
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Thus, the institutional environment of each country appears to affect the 
willingness of firms to finance their growth opportunities with bank debt. Bank debt 
decisions are dependent on the characteristics of the institutional environment in 
which firms operate, and these environments evolve in different ways in each 
country depending on the decisions adopted by the authorities. The evolutionary 
process affecting the financial systems in each country means that market 
imperfections, such as information asymmetry and agency costs, can have varying 
effects on bank debt.
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Table 1 Index of size and activity of financial markets and financial intermediaries among countries
This table shows the size and activity indicators of the banking industry (see Columns 1 and 2) and those of the financial markets (see Columns 3 and 4). The 
relative size of the market is measured by the ratio stock market capitalization to gross domestic product (GDP); the activity of financial markets is measured by 
the ratio stock market value traded to GDP; the size of banking industry is measured by the ratio deposit money bank assets to GDP; and the loan activity of 
banking industry is measured by the percentage of private credit by deposit money banks to GDP. The participation in a firm’s equity (Column 5) corresponds to 
the average ownership percentage of the three main shareholders from the 10 larger nonfinancial firms. Bank concentration (Column 6) corresponds to the 
average market share of the five larger banks from 1989 to 1996, and Columns (7) through (11) correspond, respectively, to the following ratios: intangible 
assets, short-term debt, short-term debt with financial institutions, long-term debt, and long-term debt with financial institutions, respectively; all are given in 
respect to total assets.
Country
Deposit 
Money 
Bank Assets 
to GDP
Private 
Credit by 
Deposit 
Money 
Banks to 
GDP
Stock 
Market
Capitali-
zation to 
GDP
Stock
Market
Value 
Traded to 
GDP
Equity
Participation
Bank
Concen-
tration Intangibles
Short-Term
Debt
Short-term
Debt
Financial
Institutions
Long-Term 
Debt
Long-term 
Debt
Finance
Institutions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Chile
1985–1987 0.538 0.469 0.174 0.015 0.45 0.61 n/d n/d n/d n/d n/d
1990–1992 0.419 0.398 0.573 0.043 0.088 13.841 4.859 14.128 6.882
1995–1997 0.488 0.480 0.934 0.124 0.164 15.841 5.053 11.533 6.478
2000–2001 0.619 0.605 0.759 0.073 1.153 15.216 6.148 13.701 6.796
Variation (%)
1985–2001 15.1 29.0 336.2 386.7 1210.2 9.9 26.5 –3.0 –1.2
Spain
1985–1987 0.594 0.654 0.145 0.067 0.51 0.50 1.449 32.852 8.539 23.437 13.687
1990–1992 1.054 0.805 0.225 0.074 2.220 39.097 8.016 18.629 10.746
1995–1997 1.025 0.731 0.370 0.440 3.551 36.743 6.077 17.843 9.701
2000–2001 1.174 0.968 0.727 1.600 3.167 35.738 4.461 19.824 7.008
Variation (%)
1985–2001 97.6 48.0 401.4 2288.1 118.6 8.8 –47.8 –15.4 –48.8
United States
1985–1987 0.795 0.674 0.539 0.384 0.20 0.20 n/d 22.963 1.823 20.873 4.500
1990–1992 0.755 0.665 0.616 0.332 n/d 27.943 3.260 23.973 6.891
1995–1997 0.713 0.625 0.974 0.949 n/d 27.150 2.717 20.164 5.764
2000–2001 0.817 0.732 1.332 3.067 n/d 26.888 2.332 19.740 5.193
Variation (%)
1985–2001 2.8 8.6 147.1 698.7 n/d 17.1 27.9 –5.4 15.4
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Table 1. (continued)
United Kingdom
1985–1987 0.662 0.637 0.710 0.319 0.19 0.65 n/d n/d n/d n/d n/d
1990–1992 1.123 1.117 0.879 0.315 n/d n/d n/d n/d n/d
1995–1997 1.143 1.136 1.267 0.670 n/d n/d n/d n/d n/d
2000–2001 1.284 1.281 1.575 1.299 n/d n/d n/d n/d n/d
Variation (%)
1985–2001 94.0 101.1 121.8 307.2 n/d n/d n/d n/d n/d
Germany
1985–1987 1.172 0.925 0.194 0.175 0.48 0.39 0.318 49.140 6.820 7.050 3.781
1990–1992 1.122 0.900 0.204 0.244 0.575 51.300 7.911 6.078 3.557
1995–1997 1.363 1.054 0.270 0.270 0.786 51.293 7.139 6.205 3.894
2000–2001 1.492 1.191 0.593 0.671 1.128 46.915 5.896 5.821 3.371
Variation (%)
1985–2001 27.3 28.8 205.7 283.4 254.7 –4.5 –13.5 –17.4 –10.8
Japan
1985–1987 1.139 0.984 0.731 0.547 0.18 0.32 1.059 48.437 18.402 27.973 19.850
1990–1992 1.290 1.151 0.938 0.326 1.160 43.989 14.997 29.990 20.866
1995–1997 1.258 1.123 0.666 0.263 1.309 41.892 14.326 31.069 21.628
2000–2001 1.345 1.096 0.639 0.503 1.796 38.516 11.667 28.868 19.134
Variation (%)
1985–2001 18.1 11.4 –12.6 –8.0 69.6 –20.5 –36.6 3.2 –3.6
France
1985–1987 0.897 0.764 0.149 0.065 0.34 0.44 0.740 38.816 4.724 31.018 7.523
1990–1992 1.037 0.940 0.271 0.093 1.082 36.861 3.869 28.719 6.916
1995–1997 1.019 0.842 0.365 0.233 1.721 38.479 3.501 25.396 4.395
2000–2001 1.042 0.848 0.924 0.826 2.408 40.308 3.032 22.745 3.884
Variation (%)
1985–2001 16.2 11.0 520.1 1170.8 225.4 3.8 –35.8 –26.7 –48.4
Italy
1985–1987 0.666 0.485 0.145 0.050 0.58 0.38 2.311 45.740 11.894 19.714 9.549
1990–1992 0.744 0.559 0.132 0.028 3.353 49.052 13.377 18.856 9.626
1995–1997 0.783 0.556 0.204 0.111 3.151 48.724 10.969 15.606 7.753
2000–2001 0.928 0.746 0.564 0.616 4.997 48.437 10.273 13.138 6.313
Variation (%)
1985–2001 39.3 53.8 289.0 1132.0 116.2 5.9 –13.6 –33.4 –33.9
Sources: Columns (1) through (4) are from the updated work of Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (1999) in 2001. Stock market participation, Column (5), is 
obtained from La Porta et al. (1998). Bank concentration, Column (6), is obtained from Carlin and Mayer (2003). Columns (7) through (11), are from the BACH 
database. The sources for Chile data are the Ficha Estadística Codificada Uniforme database and the Instituto Libertad y Desarrollo (1999).
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Table 2. Descriptive statistic of variables
In this table, we include average, minimum, and maximum values; standard deviation; and variance of the following variables: bank debt to total assets (BDAB), 
bank debt to total debt (BDTD), total debt to equity (TDEB), percentage of shares in the hands of the first shareholder (OWN), market value to book value (Q), 
financing deficit for the variation of fixed assets and working capital (DEF), natural logarithm of total asset values in thousands of euros (LNTAB), Altman’s Z
score coefficient (Z), and return on assets (ROA). We also use the descriptive statistic of the nature of the firm’s first shareholder: a family (FAMFM), an 
institutional investor (INSINV), a domestic firm (DOMFM), a multinational firm (MULFM), and a public firm (PUBFM).
Average Minimum Maximum Variance
Overall Chile Spain Overall Chile Spain Overall Chile Spain Overall Chile Spain
BDAB 0.14 0.12 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.75 0.75 0.70 0.02 0.02 0.02
BDTD 0.46 0.41 0.54 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.12 0.12 0.12
TDEB 0.64 0.45 0.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 62.24 7.12 62.24 2.98 0.29 6.62
OWN 42.83 44.19 40.93 0.01 2.08 0.01 99.39 99.39 99.20 653.82 620.99 694.44
Q 1.29 1.34 1.23 0.09 0.09 0.23 30.52 15.10 30.52 1.18 0.93 1.53
DEF –0.10 –0.11 –0.08 –1.63 –0.98 –1.63 0.83 0.83 0.76 0.04 0.04 0.03
LNTAB 11.00 11.24 10.66 7.07 7.07 7.28 17.18 15.74 17.18 2.61 2.40 2.71
Z 5.59 7.53 2.87 –3.64 –1.30 –3.64 135.60 91.42 135.60 110.67 142.18 53.88
ROA 0.06 0.09 0.02 –0.82 –0.61 –0.82 0.45 0.45 0.22 0.01 0.01 0.01
FAMFM 0.14 0.06 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.12 0.05 0.19
INSINV 0.31 0.40 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.21 0.24 0.15
DOMFM 0.37 0.46 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.23 0.25 0.19
MULFM 0.11 0.06 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.10 0.06 0.15
PUBFM 0.06 0.02 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.06 0.02 0.10
N Obs. 1,977 1,154 823 1,977 1,154 823 1,977 1,154 823 1,977 1,154 823
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Table 3. Test of mean differences among the variables for Chilean and Spanish samples
This table shows the test of mean differences for the combined samples of Chile and Spain. The test is performed first by comparing the mean differences for the 
combined sample categorized by country. Then, a similar analysis is performed with the samples of Chile and Spain categorized by banki debt to total assets 
(BDAB), considering superior (N-tile 1) and inferior (N-tile 3) thirds, and the mean differences for each sample categorized by bank debt to total debt (BDTD),
considering superior and inferior thirds. The variables included are: total debt to equity (TDEB), percentage of shares in the hands of the first shareholder 
(OWN), market value to book value (Q), financing deficit for the variation of fixed assets and working capital (DEF), natural logarithm of total asset values in 
thousands of euros (LNTAB), Altman’s Z score coefficient (Z), and return on assets (ROA). We also include the nature of the firm’s first shareholder: a family 
(FAMFM), an institutional investor (INSINV), a domestic firm (DOMFM), a multinational firm (MULFM), and a public firm (PUBFM).The null hypothesis is 
that equal means exist among the variables for each category. The statistical significance proves whether this hypothesis is accepted. 
Combined Sample Chile Spain
N-tiles per Country N-tiles 1 y 3 DBAB N-tiles 1 y 3 DBAB
Variable
Sig. 
(bilateral) España Chile Mean diff.
Sig. 
(bilateral) 1 3 Mean diff.
Sig. 
(bilateral) 1 3 Mean diff.
BDAB 0.000 0.168 0.116 0.052 0.000 0.004 0.268 –0.265 0.000 0.021 0.342 –0.321
BDTD 0.000 0.544 0.406 0.138 0.000 0.053 0.716 –0.663 0.000 0.214 0.803 –0.589
TDEB 0.000 0.913 0.450 0.463 0.000 0.195 0.788 –0.594 0.000 0.403 1.701 –1.298
OWN 0.005 0.409 0.442 –0.033 0.114 0.423 0.451 –0.028 0.000 47.349 38.404 8.945
Q 0.027 1.229 1.338 –0.110 0.103 1.406 1.289 0.117 0.002 1.458 1.071 0.387
DEF 0.000 –0.080 –0.113 0.032 0.029 –0.132 –0.101 –0.031 0.091 –0.068 –0.091 0.024
LNTAB 0.000 10.664 11.238 –0.573 0.978 11.133 11.137 –0.003 0.460 10.665 10.566 0.099
Z 0.000 2.866 7.532 –4.665 0.000 15.356 2.578 12.778 0.000 5.206 1.290 3.916
ROA 0.000 0.024 0.087 –0.062 0.000 0.120 0.052 0.068 0.000 0.052 –0.008 0.060
FAMFM 0.000 0.260 0.058 0.202 0.298 0.073 0.055 0.018 0.000 0.186 0.332 –0.146
INSINV 0.000 0.179 0.399 –0.220 0.527 0.388 0.410 –0.022 0.319 0.197 0.164 0.033
DOMFM 0.000 0.255 0.458 –0.203 0.536 0.440 0.462 –0.022 0.684 0.234 0.219 0.015
MULFM 0.000 0.188 0.062 0.127 0.134 0.076 0.049 0.026 0.002 0.281 0.172 0.109
PUBFM 0.000 0.118 0.023 0.094 0.996 0.023 0.023 0.000 0.680 0.102 0.113 –0.011
N Obs. 1997 769 548
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Table 4. Determinants of bank debt for samples of Chilean and Spanish firms
This table contains the results obtained for a combined sample of Chile and Spain. For Chilean sample consists of 
148 nonfinancial firms with observations from 1991 to 1999 (n = 1,154 observations), and the Spanish sample 
includes 111 nonfinancial firms with observations from 1991 to 1999 (n = 823 observations). The regression model 
estimated is
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8 9 10 11 12 13 14
,15 16
DBAB OWN Q OWN QI DEF OWNI Q DEFI TDEB DEFit it it it it it it it
LNTAB Z ROA FAMFM INSINV DOMFM MULFMit it it it it it it
DUMMTEMP DUMMSECit it it
       
      
  
= + + +  +  +  + +
+ + + + + + +
+ + +
 
where the dependent variable is bank debt to total assets (BDAB). The independent variables are shares in the hands 
of the first shareholder (OWN), growth opportunities (Q), the relation between ownership concentration and growth 
opportunities (OWN*QI), the relation between fund deficit and ownership concentration (DEF*OWNI), the relation 
among fund deficit for the financing of the firm’s portfolio of projects and growth opportunities (Q*DEF), a firm’s 
leverage (TDEB), the fund deficit for the financing of the variations of fixed assets and working capital (DEF), the 
size (LNTAB), the default risk (Z), and return on assets (ROA). We also introduce the dummy variables 
corresponding to the nature of the main owner: FAMFM for a family, INSINV for mutual funds, DOMFM for 
domestic firms, and MULFM for multinational firms, as well as the dummy variables corresponding to industry and 
the temporary ones. In all cases, Wald test reveals that the models are statistically significant. The variables OWN, 
Q, OWN*QI, DEF*OWNI, Q*DEFI are considered endogenous and have been instrumented with system estimator 
and Generalized Method of Moments. We also include the results when considering all the variables as exogenous, 
within estimators. Statistical significance are indicated as *** at 1% level, ** at 5% and * at 10%.
Chile Spain
Dependent variable: 
DBAB Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
CONST –0.1174*** 0.0165 –0.1869** 0.0302
Q –0.0001 0.6201 0.0387*** 0.0000
Q*DEFI 0.0042** 0.0244 –0.0021 0.6452
Q + Q*DEFI 0.0042*** 0.0000 0.0387*** 0.0000
OWN 0.0044* 0.0893 0.0018*** 0.0000
OWN*QI 0.0011*** 0.0000 –0.0004*** 0.0000
OWN + OWN*QI 0.0055*** 0.0000 0.0014*** 0.0000
DEF –0.0424*** 0.0007 –0.2350*** 0.0000
DEF*OWNI 0.0558* 0.0231 0.3138*** 0.0000
DEF+DEF*OWNI 0.0134*** 0.0000 0.0788*** 0.0000
TDEB 0.0698*** 0.0000 0.0040** 0.0142
LNTAB 0.0241*** 0.0000 0.0234*** 0.0003
Z –0.0019 0.0000 –0.0112*** 0.0000
ROA –0.3247*** 0.0000 –0.3562*** 0.0000
FAMFM –0.0474* 0.0537 0.1422*** 0.0000
INSINV –0.0219 0.1078 0.1178*** 0.0000
DOMFM 0.0156 0.2410 0.1307*** 0.0000
MULFM –0.0807*** 0.0000 –0.0148 0.5919
Test for first-order serial 
correlation –3.2170*** 0.0010 –3.1500** 0.0200
Test for second-order 
serial correlation –0.776 0.4380 –1.450 0.1470
Sargan test 126.4930 0.7290 70.4403 0.8880
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